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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1297 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
IMADELDIN AWAD KHAIR, 
a/k/a Nadr Khair 
 
                 Imadeldin Awad Khair, 
                                               Appellant 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District  
Court for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-15-cr-00404-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 6, 2018 
 
Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: February 28, 2018) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 Following a bench trial, Imadeldin Awad Khair was convicted of health care 
fraud, obstruction of a federal audit, tax evasion, and money laundering.  The District 
Court sentenced Khair to a term of imprisonment of 216 months.  Khair appeals his 
conviction and sentence.  In addition to raising three ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, Khair contends that the District Court applied the incorrect legal standard when it 
convicted him of health care fraud.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 In 1999, Imadeldin Awad Khair and his company, I&I Invalid Coach, were 
charged with health care fraud in New Jersey state court.  As a result, Khair and his 
company were suspended from the New Jersey Medicaid program.  Khair was 
subsequently employed by K&S Invalid Coach, a company registered by his brother, 
Badr Awad, and partially owned by Khair.  K&S applied and was approved to be a 
Medicaid provider in 2000.   
 Khair pleaded guilty to the 1999 health care fraud charge in 2003, and the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services sent Khair and his counsel preliminary 
exclusion notices for a minimum period of five years.  Khair also entered a consent order 
of debarment, confirming that he was barred from Medicare and New Jersey Medicaid 
for at least five years.  Health and Human Services sent a final letter of exclusion to Khair 
on January 30, 2004, barring him from participation in Medicare and Medicaid for a 
minimum of eleven years and requiring him to apply for reinstatement.  The letter was 
sent to the Passaic County Jail, where Khair was no longer incarcerated, and to his 
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counsel.   
 Following his release from prison, Khair returned to work at K&S.  To 
demonstrate permitted employment, Khair had his friend, Ebrahim Hazin, place him on 
the payroll at Hazin’s firm, K&K Automotive.  During this time, Khair continued 
working at K&S and was viewed as the boss by employees.  Although Khair’s reported 
salary was low, he received payments in checks written out to him and his wife from 
K&S and checks written to cash.   
In a seventeen-count Superseding Indictment returned on November 19, 2015, the 
government charged Khair with one count of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1347; one count of obstruction of a federal audit, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1516(a); 
eleven counts of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201; and four counts of money 
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (A)(ii), and (B)(i).  Before jury 
selection, Khair sought to waive his right to a trial by jury.  The District Court and the 
parties finished jury selection, and Khair again requested a bench trial.  Following a 
sworn colloquy, the government consented, and the District Court granted Khair’s 
request.   
Khair’s bench trial began on July 25, 2016, and lasted seven days.  Khair did not 
testify at trial, but his attorney argued that, while Khair knew he was excluded from 
federal health care programs for five years, he did not realize the bar extended to eleven 
years.  The District Court found Khair guilty on all counts.  Khair’s Guidelines range was 
210 to 262 months’ imprisonment.  At sentencing, the District Court rejected Khair’s 
challenges to the Guidelines calculation and his request for a downward variance and 
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imposed a sentence of 216 months’ imprisonment.  Khair appealed, challenging his 
conviction and sentence. 
II.1 
 Khair raises three ineffective assistance of counsel claims and alleges that the 
District Court applied the wrong legal standard in convicting him of health care fraud.  
Because the District Court applied the correct standard in convicting Khair, we will 
affirm.  Further, we conclude the ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not ripe for 
review. 
A. 
 As to Khair’s three ineffective assistance of counsel claims, “[w]e open with the 
observation that ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not considered on 
direct appeal.”  United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2017).  That 
general rule only gives way “when the trial record ‘is sufficient to allow determination of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.’”  Id. at 203 (quoting United States v. Polk, 577 F.3d 
515, 520 & n.2) (3d Cir. 2009)).  “Determining sufficiency is case- and claim-
dependent.”  Id. at 203.2     
 First, Khair contends that his counsel incorrectly advised him that he had a 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
2 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s 
performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  A defendant “must show that 
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured 
by “prevailing profession norms.”  Id. at 688.  Even if counsel’s performance was 
deficient, those “deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the defense 
in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”  Id. at 692.   
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Constitutional right to inclusion of people of Muslim faith on his jury.  He claims, as a 
result of that advice, he unknowingly and unintelligently waived his right to a trial by 
jury.  Second, Khair states that his counsel was ineffective in failing to call his former 
attorney as a witness during trial.  Khair claims that his prior attorney would have 
testified he never forwarded or informed Khair of the letter stating he was excluded from 
federal programs for eleven years.  Third, Khair claims that his counsel did not 
adequately address the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in submissions or 
argument to the District Court.   
 We are not presented with “the uncommon case where resolving an 
ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal is both feasible and efficient.”  Id. at 203.  We will 
not address Khair’s ineffective assistance of counsel arguments.  Khair may assert them 
in an appropriate collateral proceeding.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
B. 
 Khair also challenges his conviction, contending that the District Court applied the 
incorrect legal standard for health care fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347.  While we exercise 
plenary review over a District Court’s conclusions of law, United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002), we review here for plain error because Khair did not object 
before the District Court, United States v. Pisello, 877 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1989); cf. 
United States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 176 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying plain error review 
to unraised challenges to jury instructions).3  Under that standard, Khair must show: 
                                              
3 The parties agree plain error review applies.  Appellee’s Br. at 27; Appellant’s Reply 
Br. at 21. 
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“(1) error, (2) that is plain or obvious, and (3) that affects a defendant’s substantial 
rights.”  United States v. Ferguson, 876 F.3d 512, 514 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting United 
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008)).  “If all three conditions are met, an 
appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if 
. . . the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. at 514 (alterations in original) (quoting Goodson, 544 F.3d at 539)).  
 In support of his assertion that the District Court applied an erroneous legal 
standard, Khair highlights one statement during the District Court’s findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: “there were funds that came from Medicare and Medicaid when Mr. 
Khair was involved in the business when he knew or certainly should have known he was 
precluded from engaging in any type of business where a substantial amount of money 
was coming from Medicare and Medicaid.”  App. 15 (emphasis added).  Relying on the 
statement “certainly should have known,” Khair contends that the District Court 
determined his guilt “based upon a non-criminal mental state.”  Appellant’s Br. at 29.   
But a thorough review of the District Judge’s statements belies that assertion.  
Among other statements, the District Court found that Khair knew (1) “he had an 
exclusion and that exclusion was for the 11-year period,” App. 9; (2) “he had an 
obligation to request reinstatement” but “never made any efforts whatsoever to be 
reinstated,” App. 9; (3) he “was involved in the business in a position and in a role that 
was unequivocally precluded and prohibited by HHS and OIG and [ ] was certainly aware 
of that,” App. 11; and (4) he was excluded, which “prompted obviously all of the 
misrepresentations and the lies that were taking place,” App. 13.  The District Court 
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found Khair’s conduct constituted “willful conduct and certainly conduct that evidences a 
consciousness of guilt on the part of Mr. Khair.”  App. 12.  Based on the District Court’s 
repeated statements concerning both Khair’s knowledge and willfulness, we conclude a 
stray comment by the District Court, taken out of context, does not constitute plain error 
in this case.  Accordingly, we will affirm Khair’s conviction for health care fraud.4       
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
                                              
4 Because we will affirm Khair’s conviction for health care fraud, we need not reach his 
argument concerning his convictions for money laundering.  That argument was 
contingent on overturning Khair’s health care fraud conviction.  See Appellant’s Br. at 48 
(“In the event the Court overturns Khair’s conviction on Count One . . . then it must also 
overturn his convictions for Counts Fourteen through Seventeen for money laundering 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii) and (B)(i).”). 
